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ABSTRACT:  PPP offers numerous 
benefits to both public and private partners 
in delivery of infrastructure projects. 
However this partnership also involves 
great risks which have to be adequately 
managed and mitigated. Private partners 
are especially sensitive to revenue risk, 
since they are mostly interested in the 
financial viability of the project. Thus they 
often expect public partners to provide 
some kind of risk-sharing mechanism in 
the form of Minimum Revenue Guarantees 
or abandonment options. The objective of 
this paper is to investigate whether the real 
option of abandoning the project increases 
its value. Therefore the binominal option 
pricing model and risk-neutral probability 
approach have been implemented to price 
the European and American abandonment 
options for the Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) toll road investment. The obtained 
results suggest that the project value 
with the American abandonment option 
is greater than with the European 
abandonment option, hence implying that 
American options offer greater flexibility 
and are more valuable for private partners.
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During the last few decades researchers and practitioners have paid a lot of 
attention to the concept of public-private partnership (PPP). It is usually 
defined as the “cooperation between public and private participants of a 
permanent nature, in which participants develop mutual products and/or 
services with shared risk, expenses and profit” (Rakic and Radjenovic, 2011, p. 
209). The main reason for the great interest in this kind of cooperation is that 
many governments obtain the necessary funds for financing fundamental 
infrastructure projects by resorting to partnerships with the private sector. The 
number of PPP projects and countries using this form of cooperation has been 
growing rapidly since the beginning of the 21st century. The current public debt 
crisis has put additional emphasis on partnership with the private sector as it 
provides public budget relief and meets public needs. Therefore developing and 
emerging countries see in PPPs the potential for developing infrastructure and 
augmenting economic growth. 
PPP can offer numerous benefits to public-private partners and the whole 
community in the delivery of public services and realisation of public projects, 
compared to traditional public procurement. When choosing to realise public 
projects through PPP, public partners seek to determine whether this will 
enhance the efficiency of the public sector and whether these projects offer 
better value for tax payers’ money as compared to traditional state investment; 
i.e., the public partners are oriented toward achieving socio-economic and 
political benefits. Clearly, they want to ensure that the project with the private 
partner provides cost-efficient, reliable, and on-time services at the agreed price 
and in accordance with the arranged quality standards, as defined by the 
contract (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). This effectively means that the PPP project 
has to be cost-efficient, and this is what the public sector is mostly interested in. 
On the other hand, the private sector is mainly interested in the long-term 
financial benefits that come from the partnership. 
Although driven by different objectives, they can jointly reach these objectives 
via the mutual aim of delivering a successful project. The realisation of the 
objectives through PPP projects implies huge risks that have to be properly 
allocated and managed by both of the involved parties. Adequate allocation of 
risk in PPP projects is a crucial factor in their success and it is widely accepted 
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“the goal is not to maximize, but optimize risk transfer” (Carbonara et al., 2011, 
p. 1). 
A possible way to manage and alleviate risk is through incorporating flexibility 
into PPP contracts by adding special clauses that can diminish risk by, for 
instance, modifying the order and time of activities. The Real Option approach 
can be used to model this contractual flexibility. It can be applied both to 
mitigating risk and to evaluating managerial flexibility, which increases the 
value of the project by enabling project managers to change their decisions 
depending on the project’s future performance.  
In addition to real option methodology other valuation methodologies can also 
be applied to PPP projects, such as expert systems and statistical analysis, game 
theory, and artificial neural networks; but in this paper we will focus only on 
Real Option Analysis (ROA) and previous research concerning its application in 
the valuation of PPP projects.
1 Additionally, we will present a numerical 
example of a toll road investment with the option to abandon. 
2. REAL OPTION THEORY 
The simple reasoning for real options is presented in Brealey and Myers (2003, 
p. 268) as follows:  “When you use discounted cash flow (DCF) to value a 
project, you implicitly assume that all assets are held passively. But managers are 
not paid to be dummies. After they have invested in a new project, they do not 
simply sit back and watch the future unfold. If things go well, the project may be 
expanded, if they go badly, the project may be cut back or abandoned 
altogether. Projects that can easily be modified in these ways are more valuable 
than those that do not provide such flexibility… Options to modify projects are 
known as real options”.  
Real option theory is an extension of financial option theory to real assets and 
projects. Myers (1977) initially proposed the term ‘real option’ for the 
employment of option pricing theory and methods from finance for valuation of 
                                                 
1   For details of the mentioned valuation methodologies see Apanavičienė and Rudžianskaitė 
Kvaraciejienė (2010). 
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practitioners have paid a lot of attention to this technique as an important tool 
for investment valuation and strategy (Borison, 2005). This is especially due to 
the fact that the traditional Net Present Value (NPV) approach to valuing 
investment projects has demonstrated numerous drawbacks.
2 
Similar to financial options - which give the holder the right, but not the 
obligation, to buy or sell a security at a predetermined price on a specific date - a 
real option gives the holder the right to take decisions concerning an asset or a 
project at a predetermined price or pre-specified time over the life of the option 
(Lawrence and Thomas, 2008, p. 3). ROA enables project managers to increase 
project value by detecting and exploiting opportunities for minimising losses 
and maximising gains in a dynamic market environment. Further, ROA 
deduces terminology from financial options, meaning that real option value is a 
function of the variables presented in Table 1.  
Table 1. Comparison of real and financial options 
Variable  Financial option  Real option 
S 
Value of the underlying 
risky asset 
Expected cash flows from the 
project – value of the project 
X  Exercise price  Investment costs 
T  Time to maturity  Time to maturity 
 
Volatility of the 
underlying risky asset 
Volatility in the expected cash 
flows from the project 
r  Risk-free interest rate  Risk-free interest rate 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on Lee (2011, p. 6) and Lawrence and Thomas (2008, p. 3) 
The option value is linked to project uncertainty. Unlike DCF analysis, in which 
the investment value depreciates with the volatility increase, ROA attempts to 
find and value the managerial flexibility in the project; i.e., the embedded option 
(Lee, 2011). Real options must be identified before they can be valued. Copeland 
and Antikarov (2003) designed a four-step model which is widely used by 
                                                 
2   For details about problems with the NPV approach see Radjenovic (2008, pp. 83-84). 
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The four steps are:  
  calculation of the NPV of the project without flexibility;  
  usage of an event tree to model uncertainties; 
  usage of a decision tree to identify and integrate possible managerial 
flexibility; 
  calculation of the new value of the project with and without managerial 
flexibility; that is, the total project value and the option value. 
There are two types of options, call options and put options. A call option gives 
the holder the right to buy the real asset if its price is above the predetermined 
level (exercise price) at a pre-specified date in the future (expiration date). A put 
option gives the right to sell the asset if the price falls below the exercise price in 
the future. An option becomes more valuable when it is closer to its exercise 
price. The value of the call option C is given in Equation 1, while the value of the 
put option P is presented in Equation 2 (Mun, 2002). European options can be 
exercised only at maturity, while American options can be exercised at any time 
before maturity.  
 0 , X S MAX C    (1) 
 0 , S X MAX P    (2) 
There are numerous option types: expansion options, abandonment options, 
deferral options, options to contract, options to switch, compound options, etc. 
(Hull, 2006; Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis, 2001; Trigeorgis, 1996; Trigeorgis and 
Mason, 2001). All these option types take into account managerial flexibility to 
alter the project or asset in order to respond to changing market conditions. In 
the case of an abandonment option, management can decide to dispose of an 
asset for salvage value once market conditions turn unfavourable. Basically, the 
option to abandon is a put option that enables hedging against an economic 
downturn (Brach, 2003, p. 80). On the other hand, the option to expand is a call 
option that enables managers to take advantage of favourable market 
conditions; for instance, by expanding the capacity of the asset to meet the 
increasing demand.  
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projects orientated toward exploitation of natural resources, research and 
development projects, developing and testing new drugs and technologies, 
expanding existing projects, entering into new marketplaces, etc. 
In the context of infrastructure investment, for instance, a toll road investment, 
when revenues are lower or higher than expected, real options can offer the 
flexibility to avoid possible losses or exploit extra profit. The PPP contract can 
have a clause that enables private partners to exercise an abandonment option 
and sell the project to public partners for salvage value when revenue streams 
are lower than anticipated, thus increasing the market value of the project. 
Contrary, the PPP contract can have a clause that enables public partners to 
have the same managerial flexibility when revenue streams are higher than 
expected, i.e., they can exercise the option and redeem the project to their 
ownership from the private partners.  
Before proceeding to the quantitative valuation of real options, we will discuss 
the findings of previous research. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are numerous theoretical and empirical studies that deal with ROA in 
PPP projects, concerning both risk mitigation strategies and managerial 
flexibility vis-a-vis investment decisions. When considering risk mitigation 
strategies the studies are mostly orientated toward revenue risk. 
Revenue risk is common to almost every PPP project because of the long 
contract duration – usually 20 to 30 years. Revenue risk is the risk that the 
project will result in insufficient cash flows to cover the project costs, service 
debt obligations, and provide the expected return on investment. A widely used 
strategy to mitigate revenue risk is a government Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
(MRG) where “government guarantees that project revenue will not fall below a 
specified limit during the contract” (Ali et al., 2012, p. 1600). This strategy is of 
special interest to the private investors, as their involvement depends on the 
project’s financial viability (Chiara, 2006). 
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investors that has a MRG clause should be flexible enough to encourage 
development of the infrastructure project in multiple stages. Development of a 
PPP project in multiple stages considerably reduces the value of the guarantee 
clause in a MRG contract, thus decreasing the risk retained by the government. 
Chiara (2006) proposed a new valuation framework for mitigating revenue risk 
in the operational phase of a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project. In his study 
three risk-mitigation BOT contracts are endorsed and implemented as multiple-
exercise real options valued by Multi-Least Squares Monte Carlo method 
(MLSM) and Multi-Exercise Boundary method (MEB), which represent the 
combination of dynamic programming techniques and Monte Carlo simulation. 
The results highlight the importance of these methods in the assessment and 
allocation of risk in BOT projects. 
Ho and Liu (2002) developed the BOT option valuation model in order to 
evaluate the impact of government guarantees and negotiation options on the 
financial viability of privatized infrastructure projects, and concluded that their 
model is a good foundation in the financial evaluation of PPP projects.  
Lee (2011) investigated project value by using the DCF method and the ROA 
approach and compared project values when MRG and abandonment options 
were considered. His findings suggest that the project value is enhanced by 
government guarantees, since the project is safer and thus more favourable to 
the concessionaire. Additionally, if the government raises the MRG or coverage 
ratio of the abandonment option, the value of the project will be increased. 
Furthermore, volatility is proven to be quite valuable, since highly uncertain 
projects with government guarantees are more valuable than less uncertain 
projects. 
Similarly, Huang and Chou (2006) applied ROA to value the MRG and the 
option to abandon in BOT projects. The obtained results suggest that both 
MRG and the abandonment option can create value, but when they are 
combined they counteract each other and their values are reduced.  
Vajdić and Damnjanović (2011) developed a valuation method for pricing the 
buyback option as a risk mitigation strategy. This option enables public partners 
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anticipated. The proposed model employs the expected value of the project as 
the underlying asset in the option pricing (European call). However, their model 
has limitations, as it includes neither future operational and maintenance costs 
for the public sector nor remaining project debt.  
Kashani (2012) proposed a market-based risk-neutral option valuation model in 
order to adequately capture the traffic demand uncertainty and determine the 
fair value of MRG and Traffic Revenue Cap
3 (TRC) options in BOT projects. 
His findings confirm that an increase in traffic volatility increases the 
uncertainty of future project revenues, thus leading to project 
underperformance and, in turn, to a negative value of the concessionaire 
investment. Additionally, as the BOT project progresses, the risk of 
underestimation of future traffic demand increases. The study also confirms 
that MRG is valuable in situations where private sector investment in 
infrastructure projects is reduced due to the high levels of traffic demand 
uncertainty. Furthermore, the study demonstrates that TRC “can be an effective 
mechanism for sharing the ‘upside’ potential between the concessionaires and 
the government by splitting the surplus revenue resulting from excessive growth 
of the traffic demand beyond the anticipated levels” (Kashani, 2012, p. 154). 
Therefore the suggested model can be a helpful tool for private and public 
partners to better analyse and understand the financial risk of BOT projects 
under traffic demand uncertainty. 
These findings are in line with Ashuri et al. (2010), who investigated the 
significance of traffic revenue volatility in BOT projects and concluded that 
MRG and TRC can serve as viable risk-revenue-sharing mechanisms in these 
projects. The proposed model is proven valuable to both public and private 
partners, since private partners can decide whether to invest in the project based 
on the risk level, offered guarantees, and anticipated costs, while public partners 
can identify the optimal level of MRG and TRC thresholds in order to avoid 
underinvestment or overinvestment in BOT projects. 
                                                 
3   Traffic Revenue Cap is a mechanism between public and private partners to share the surplus 
revenue when traffic demand significantly exceeds projected levels 
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proposed the application of an option pricing model for capturing the strategic 
value hidden in the flexibility to defer infrastructure projects. After applying the 
proposed valuation model to value a deferral option for the Dulles Greenway 
project, they concluded that ignoring its value would grossly underestimate the 
potential value of the project, since the option value was huge. 
Ford et al. (2002) suggested that a real options approach should be used in order 
to exploit strategic flexibility by identifying and capturing project values hidden 
in dynamic uncertainties. The obtained results, based on the toll road project, 
demonstrated that using the structured real options approach in construction 
management can increase returns through improved project planning and 
management.  
Van der Velde (2010) presented the project feasibility analysis model, developed 
to identify relations concerning the financial or strategic aims of the public and 
private partners and their commitment to the organisation of the project. His 
results propose that ROA can be used for PPP projects, but their strategic use is 
far more valuable than their functional use. His findings indicate that, given that 
the ROA process consists of the identification, manageability, and value of 
uncertainty, the first two parts of the ROA can be used for PPP projects, while 
the value is difficult to determine. Nevertheless, he suggests the strategic use of 
real options and concludes that the value of every PPP project increases when 
ROA is used.  
As we can see from the above discussion, the number of studies concerning 
ROA applicability in PPP projects is vast, and while some only propose and 
develop theoretical models, others are focused on practical examples, mostly in 
BOT projects. Thus, before presenting a numerical example of toll road 
investment, we will explain the methodology applied. 
4. OPTION VALUATION METHODOLOGY 
According to Mun (2002), numerous option pricing methodologies can be 
applied to the valuation of real options, such as the Black-Scholes model, Monte 
Carlo path-dependent simulation methods, lattices (binominal, trinomial, 
multinomial), variance reduction, and other numerical techniques. All these 
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underlying at maturity, then calculate the option payoff at maturity by applying 
the probabilities of these possible future values, and finally to determine the 
actual option value by computing the present value of this probability weighted 
option payoffs (De Maeseneire, 2006). However, certain methods are not 
sufficiently flexible to reflect all features of complex real-world projects. The 
binomial valuation method is one of the more flexible option pricing models 
and is probably the most suitable model for valuing investment with high 
uncertainty (Radjenovic, 2008). This model offers significant benefits over other 
option pricing methodologies because it is easy to implement and explain, 
although it requires significant computing power.  
The binomial option pricing model is a discrete model, which was first 
developed by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein in 1979. This model offers almost the 
same results as the continuous Black-Scholes Model, but it is simpler to derive 
and understand. The binominal option pricing model is based on scenario 
analysis and a binominal tree for valuing options. The result can be obtained in 
two ways: by applying the replicating portfolio approach or the risk-neutral 
probabilities approach.  
The main assumptions of the replicating portfolio approach are no arbitrage 
opportunities, and the existence of a number of market-traded assets that can be 
acquired to replicate the existing asset’s payoff profile (Liu, 2006). However, 
according to Mun (2002), these assumptions are hard to accept in a real options 
world where specific projects are valued. Contrary, the risk-neutral probability 
approach uses risk-adjusted probabilities of specific cash flows and discounts 
them at a risk-free rate. The results obtained by these two approaches are 
identical, but the advantage of the risk-neutral probability approach over the 
replicating portfolio approach is that the values of risk-neutral probabilities do 
not change as we move from node to node, which is not the case with units of 
underlying (N) and bonds (B) in the replicating portfolio method (Copeland 
and Antikarov, 2003). Thus, in this study the risk-neutral probability approach 
will be applied. 
The binomial option pricing model is based on a simple formulation for the 
underlying asset value process, in which the underlying asset can move to only 
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This model has two lattices: the underlying asset value lattice (Figure 1) and the 
option value lattice (Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
Figure 1. Binominal Lattice for the Underlying Asset Value 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on Mun (2002, p. 145) 
Figure 2. Binominal Lattice for the European Put Option 
 
Source: Authors’ presentation based on Song (2006, p. 35) 
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Source: Authors’ presentation based on Song (2006, p. 35) 
The binominal approach requires two steps: estimation of the risk-neutral 
probability and determination of the option value. In order to calculate the 
option value the variables presented in Table 1 are required. These variables are 
used to determine risk-neutral probability p. In order to calculate the upside and 
downside movement, risk-neutral probability, and, finally, option value, it is 
important to know the volatility of the value of the underlying asset () and 
time steps between nodes (h), since (Hull, 2006): 
h e u
   (3) 
u
d
1
  (4) 
d u
d e
p
rh


  (5) 
rh e
V p pV
V
   

) 1 (
 (6) 
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flows. The upside and downside movements are return values that the 
underlying can have at maturity. The upside potential is an increase of the 
present value of the underlying, while the downside potential is a possible loss of 
the value of the underlying. Hence, this up and down uncertainty creates the 
value in an option. If volatility increases, these up and down factors are higher, 
as well as the option value.  
eNPV = NPV + Options Value  (7) 
Finally, the expanded net present value (eNPV) shown in equation (7) is “the 
sum of the deterministic base case net present value and the strategic options 
value” (Mun, 2002, p. 168). This eNPV takes into account both the NPV of the 
project and the added value of flexibility to execute the strategic option 
embedded in the project. 
5. THE OPTION TO ABANDON A TOLL ROAD INVESTMENT 
Toll road investments are usually realised through BOT projects. BOT is a form 
of PPP model in which private partners are responsible for the financing, 
construction, and operation of a facility for the contract period, during which 
they collect revenues in the form of user charges (Rakić, 2011). Since these 
projects usually last 25 to 40 years they are exposed to various risks. The 
successful delivery of BOT investment projects implies the efficient mitigation 
of those risks. Private partners are especially sensitive to revenue risk, so they 
often expect the public partner to offer some kind of risk-sharing mechanism.  
In order to alleviate project risks the public partner may offer the private 
partner the possibility of abandoning the project and transferring it back to the 
public sector for a specific predetermined price (exercise price), or selling it to a 
third party in the market. Consequently, the BOT project becomes safer and 
more favourable from the private partner’s perspective. The private partner will 
liquidate the project when “the exercise price is greater than the present value of 
cash flow in case private partner hold the project” (Lee, 2011, p. 15), meaning 
that this embedded option increases project value. 
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option or an American abandonment option. While the European option can be 
exercised only at a specific date, the American option can be exercised at any 
date during a specified period. Since the American abandonment option offers 
greater managerial flexibility it is assumed that it creates greater value for the 
project. Therefore the following hypotheses will be tested: 
H0: The value of the project with a European abandonment option is smaller 
than the value of the project with an American abandonment option. 
H1: The value of the project with a European abandonment option is greater 
than the value of the project with an American abandonment option. 
To test these hypotheses we employ the binomial option pricing model to 
evaluate European and American abandonment options. In order to determine 
the value of these put options we present an illustrative example of a toll road 
investment. 
Suppose that the present value of future cash flows from the toll road 
investment is €100 million. The volatility is ±30% per annum. The risk-free rate 
is 5%. The public partner offers the private partner the possibility of abandoning 
the project in the first 5 years of the project life only, for the salvage value of €80 
million. Based on these parameters we can calculate the upward and downward 
movements, as well as the risk-neutral probability, by applying equations 3, 4, 
and 5: 
35 . 1
1 * 30 . 0    e e u
h   
74 . 0
35 . 1
1 1
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u
d  
51 . 0
74 . 0 35 . 1
74 . 0
1 * 05 . 0



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


e
d u
d e
p
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The binominal lattice for the underlying project value (Figure 4) is calculated 
based on the formulas presented in Figure 1, but extended to incorporate a 5-
period project value. All calculations are done using Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets. 
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calculation for the European put option, which can only be exercised in the fifth 
year (Figure 5). The end payoffs of the project with flexibility to abandon at each 
six terminal nodes A, B, C, D, E, and F, are: 
A: MAX [X, V] = MAX [80, 448.17] = 448.17 
B: MAX [X, V] = MAX [80, 245.96] = 245.96 
C: MAX [X, V] = MAX [80, 134.99] = 134.99 
D: MAX [X, V] = MAX [80, 74.08] = 80 
E: MAX [X, V] = MAX [80, 40.06] = 80 
F: MAX [X, V] = MAX [80, 22.31] = 80 
Figure 4. Value of the underlying project 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
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Source: Authors’ calculation 
Values of other nodes are calculated by employing formula 6 all the way back to 
node U, in the following mode: 
G:  01 . 332
96 . 245 * 49 . 0 17 . 448 * 51 . 0 ) 1 (
1 * 05 . 0 


 
e e
B p pA
rh  
H:  21 . 182
99 . 134 * 49 . 0 96 . 245 * 51 . 0 ) 1 (
1 * 05 . 0 


 
e e
C p pB
rh  
I:  76 . 102
80 * 49 . 0 99 . 134 * 51 . 0 ) 1 (
1 * 05 . 0 


 
e e
D p pC
rh  
J:  10 . 76
80 * 49 . 0 80 * 51 . 0 ) 1 (
1 * 05 . 0 


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e e
E p pD
rh  
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

 
e e
F p pE
rh  
U:  20 . 107
37 . 86 * 49 . 0 01 . 138 * 51 . 0 ) 1 (
1 * 05 . 0 


 
e e
T p pS
rh  
Thus, the value of the European abandonment option represents the value of the 
project with flexibility minus the value of the project without flexibility, that is: 
European abandonment option = 107.20 – 100 = €7.20 million. 
In order to test our hypothesis we calculate the value of the American 
abandonment option as well (Figure 6). This option can be exercised in the fifth 
year or at any time before that. Hence, the end payoffs (nodes A, B, C, D, E, and 
F) in the fifth year are the same as for the European put and are calculated in the 
same way. 
The values of the intermediate nodes are calculated all the way back to node U 
in the following mode: 
G: MAX [X; rh e
B p pA ) 1 (  
] = MAX [80; 1 * 05 . 0
96 . 245 * 49 . 0 17 . 448 * 51 . 0
e

] = 332.01 
H: MAX [X; rh e
C p pB ) 1 (  
] = MAX [80; 1 * 05 . 0
99 . 134 * 49 . 0 96 . 245 * 51 . 0
e

] = 182.21 
I: MAX [X; rh e
D p pC ) 1 (  
] = MAX [80; 1 * 05 . 0
80 * 49 . 0 99 . 134 * 51 . 0
e

] = 102.76 
J: MAX [X; rh e
E p pD ) 1 (  
] = MAX [80; 1 * 05 . 0
80 * 49 . 0 80 * 51 . 0
e

] = 80 
K: MAX [X; rh e
F p pE ) 1 (  
] = MAX [80; 1 * 05 . 0
80 * 49 . 0 80 * 51 . 0
e

] = 80 
U: MAX [X; rh e
T p pS ) 1 (  
] = MAX [80; 1 * 05 . 0
05 . 89 * 49 . 0 41 . 138 * 51 . 0
e

] = 108.64 
The logic behind these calculations in each node is that the private partner is 
willing to abandon the project, i.e., sell the project, at the predetermined value of 
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with the project. In node D (Figure 6) the value of abandoning the project is €80 
million as compared to €74.08 million: hence in this node the decision of the 
private partner is to abandon the project, and the profit-maximizing value of 
node D becomes the abandonment value of €80 million.  
Figure 6. Value of the project with American abandonment option 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Hence, the value of the American put option is: 
American abandonment option = 108.64 – 100 = €8.64 million. 
Based on the obtained results we can accept the null hypothesis that the value of 
the project with the European abandonment option is smaller than the value of 
the project with the American abandonment option; i.e., 107.20 < 108.64. The 
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more valuable than the possibility of exercising the option in the fifth year only. 
Hence, those contracts which offer greater flexibility are more valuable for 
private partners.  
In the previous example we have used only five time steps, each one-year long, 
although we could apply twenty or thirty just by reducing their length. The 
accuracy of the results is increased by increasing the number of time steps. Thus 
the obtained results can be viewed only as an approximation of the option value 
and should be taken with caution.  
Furthermore, one of the most important inputs for the option valuation is the 
volatility, which we assumed to be constant over the project life. But volatility is 
used to measure the uncertainty of the investment value over time, and when 
transportation infrastructure projects are in question the volatility is difficult to 
estimate due to the project uniqueness and the nonexistence of historical data 
regarding the market price of transportation projects. Additionally, the volatility 
may not be constant during the life of the option, thus making the option 
valuation even more difficult.  
6. CONCLUSION  
PPP has become widely used to deliver vital infrastructure projects for which 
there are insufficient funds in public sector budgets. But this cooperation 
implies huge risks, which have to be adequately managed and mitigated. 
Because private partners are mostly concerned with the financial feasibility of 
the project they are especially sensitive to revenue risk. In order to alleviate this 
risk, public partners offer private partners numerous risk mitigation strategies 
such as MRG, TRC, and abandonment options, thus providing them flexibility 
to decide upon their investments during the project life. The ROA approach was 
introduced because traditional approaches to valuing investment opportunities 
do not consider managerial flexibility to revise decisions in the future.  
ROA enables project managers to increase project value by detecting and 
exploiting loss minimizing and profit maximising opportunities in a dynamic 
market environment. In the context of a toll road investment, for example, the 
PPP contract may have a clause by which private partners may exercise the 
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public partners for salvage value.  
The objective of this paper has been to apply ROA to the valuation of the option 
to abandon a toll road investment. Of the numerous option pricing 
methodologies for real options valuation we decided to employ the binominal 
valuation method, due to its flexibility and suitability for valuing highly 
uncertain investments. The result can be obtained either by applying the 
replicating portfolio approach or the risk-neutral probabilities approach: we 
chose the second option because risk-neutral probabilities are unchangeable 
when moving from node to node.  
A hypothetical example of a BOT toll road investment was used to determine 
the value of the European option to abandon the project in the fifth year, and 
the value of the American option to abandon the project at any time within the 
first five years of the project life. After calculating the value of the project with 
European and American abandonment options the null hypothesis was 
confirmed, suggesting that the value of the project with the European 
abandonment option is smaller than the value of the project with the American 
abandonment option. The possibility of exercising the option within the 5-years 
period is €1.44 million more valuable than the possibility of exercising the 
option in the fifth year only. Hence, those contracts which incorporate 
American options offer greater flexibility and are more valuable for private 
partners. 
Nevertheless, the presented results should be taken with caution due to the fact 
that a small number of time steps has been applied (five time steps, each lasting 
one year) and the assumed volatility does not change during the project life.  
110
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